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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-THE TEST OF
CONSUMER EXPECTATION FOR
"NATURAL" DEFECTS IN FOOD PRODUCTS
In virtually every American jurisdiction, a plaintiff may recover
damages for physical injuries received from the consumption of a
food product containing a deleterious foreign object or substance.
Assume, for example, that a consumer is seriously injured by swal-
lowing small pieces of broken glass in a chicken pot pie. A consumer
injured by an object so manifestly foreign to a food product generally
may recover damages from the defendant manufacturer, seller, or
restaurateur for negligence or breach of implied warranty, or under
a strict liability theory.' Consider, however, the plight of a consumer
injured not by glass particles, but by tiny, sharp fragments of chicken
bone buried in the chicken pot pie. Can the consumer recover dam-
ages in such a case, when the injurious substance is not necessarily
foreign to the ingredients of the food product? That is the question
with which this Note is concerned.
There is a split of authority over which of two widely used tests
should be applied in these cases. For many years, liability was com-
monly denied as a matter of law whenever the deleterious substance
in a food product was determined to be "natural," not "foreign," to
the product's ingredients.2 A few states, however, rejected the foreign-
natural distinction as the controlling test and held that food proces-
sors could be liable for damages if the injurious natural substance was
one that a consumer would not customarily expect to find in a partic-
ular food product.' The latter standard, often called the "reasonable
expectation" or "consumer expectation" test, has recently been
adopted in several jurisdictions.4
In Ohio, the applicable standard of liability for "natural" defects
E.g., Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 59 P.2d 142 (1936) (ground glass in chow
mein); Gannon v. S.S. Kresge Co., 114 Conn. 36, 157 A. 541 (1931) (glass particle in sandwich):
Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 178 So. 2d 421, writ denied, 248 La. 469, 179 So. 2d 641
(1965) (recognizing rule); Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634
(1935) (rat excrement in liver pudding).
2 E.g., Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936): Goodwin v. Country
Club, 323 I11. App. I, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944); Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366
(1941).
3 E.g., Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Lore v. DeSimone
Bros., 12 Misc. 2d 174, 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958): Wood v. Waldorf System, Inc., 79
R.I. I, 83 A.2d 90 (1951).
1 E.g., Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1974): Zabner v.
Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1967); Stark v. Chock Full O'Nuts. 77 Misc. 2d
553, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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in food is uncertain. The only significant pronouncement on the sub-
ject was made by the Supreme Court of Ohio in a 1960 decision,
Allen v. Grafton,' in which the court perplexingly vacillated between
the naturalness and expectation tests before it ultimately denied re-
covery to the plaintiff as a matter of law. The Allen decision and its
significance to food products liability in Ohio are discussed in section
II of this Note.
This Note will examine the food products liability cases in
which injury is caused by a deleterious natural object or substance
contained in an otherwise acceptable food product. It will discuss
the development of the foreign-natural and reasonable expectation
tests, the merits of each, and the current trend toward adoption of
the expectation test. Finally, in light of the conspicuous ambiguity of
Ohio law on the subject, this Note shall present the argument that
Ohio should align itself more resolutely with those states that have
adopted the reasonable expectation approach.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN-NATURAL AND
REASONABLE EXPECTATION TESTS
Liability for physical injury caused by a harmful substance con-
tained in a food product is usually predicated upon one or more of
three theories of recovery.' In all jurisdictions, negligence is an avail-
able theory when a food processor violates its duty of care by includ-
ing in its product a deleterious substance or object unknown to the
consumer.7 Most states also recognize an action for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability-generally meaning "fitness for human
consumption" in the case of food products 8-which is a hybrid of
contract and tort theories. The warranty action can normally be
maintained against processors,9 retail sellers," and restaurateurs."
170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960).
In addition to the three grounds for recovery mentioned in the text, other possible
grounds are deceit, misrepresentation, and false advertising. For an excellent analysis compar-
ing the various theories for recovery in products liability cases in general, see E. SWARTZ,
HAZARDOUS PRODUcTS LITIGATION 47-83 (1973).
1 E.g., Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959): Lore v. DeSimone
Bros., 12 Misc. 2d 174, 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958): Ward Baking Co. v. Tri//ino, 27
Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
In several states, violation of state pure food and drug laws constitutes negligence per se.
See. e.g., Meshbesher v. Channallene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104. 119 N.W. 428 (1909):
Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926): Allen v. Grafton.
170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960).
E.g., Lore v. DeSimone Bros., 12 Misc. 2d 174, 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958):
Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E.2d 734 (1938); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942).
1 Johnson v. Stoddard, 310 Mass. 232, 37 N.E.2d 505 (1941): Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942).
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The third theory of recovery, available in a few states, is strict liabil-
ity in tort.12
As indicated above, most courts have little difficulty in holding
a food processor or seller liable upon at least one of these theories
for an injury caused by a food item containing "foreign" objects, such
as nails, stones, insects, and glass particles. But courts are divided on
whether liability may be incurred for an injury resulting from objects
which are "natural" to an ingredient in the product, such as bones,
nut shells, and fruit pits or seeds. In states where the foreign-natural
test is applied, even if an injured plaintiff can establish an otherwise
legally sufficient claim of negligence, breach of implied warranty, or
strict tort liability, a food processor may be free from liability as a
matter of law if the deleterious object or substance in the food is one
"natural" to the ingredients of the product, 3 as in the example of
the chicken bone in the chicken pot pie. However, in states where the
reasonable expectation test is the rule, liability might be incurred on
any appropriate theory even for a "natural" defect if it is one not
reasonably anticipated by the consumer. Thus the question of
whether the foreign-natural test or the reasonable expectation test
should apply in a particular jurisdiction is significant regardless of the
theory upon which a right to recover is claimed. 4
A. Origins of the Naturalness Test-The Mix Doctrine
The.premier discussion of the "natural defect" problem was
provided in Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 5 in which the California
Supreme Court held that a chicken pie containing a chicken bone
which had injured the plaintiff was not unfit for human consumption.
The plaintiff in Mix had purchased the chicken pie in a restaurant
operated by the defendant corporation. The recovery of damages
sought was grounded upon two theories: negligence and breach of an
implied warranty of fitness. While the court clearly acknowledged
that a restaurant operator could be held liable for serving food not
10 Ward v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918): Kniess v.
Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E.2d 734 (1938); Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890.
162 P.2d 801 (1945).
1 Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 59 P.2d 142 (1936); Schuler v. Union News
Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N.E.2d 465 (1936); Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 281 N.Y. 474. 24
N.E.2d 131 (1939); Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E.2d 731 (1938).
12 Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1974). See
ReSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
'3 E.g., cases cited note 2 supra.
', See Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1967): Betehia v. Cape Cod
Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
" 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
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"reasonably fit" for eating, it affirmed the defendant's demurrer on
both counts in the belief that the chicken pie was not made unfit by
the presence of a chicken bone.
The Mix decision is generally cited for the proposition that lia-
bility must be denied as a matter of law when the injurious substance
in the food product is natural to the food itself. While such an inter-
pretation is not totally inaccurate, it oversimplifies the underlying
basis of the court's opinion. The court began its analysis by noting
that all of the previous cases it had examined involved injuries caused
by manifestly foreign objects. No precedent could be found for ex-
tending implied warranty liability to cover the presence of bones
natural to a meat product. The plaintiff contended that the trial court
could properly hold as a matter of law that the chicken pie was not
unfit for consumption only if the court could take judicial notice that
chicken pies usually contain chicken bones. The court, however,
found it necessary to hold only that, as a matter of common knowl-
edge, chicken pies occasionally contain chicken bones."6 Thus the
court at times did focus upon the consumer's expectations as well as
upon the naturalness of the defect.
Did the Mix court deny recovery because chicken bones are
natural to the ingredients of chicken pie or because a consumer cus-
tomarily expects to find an occasional bone in chicken pie? The court
stated that a deviation from perfection in the quality of a food prod-
uct does not necessarily render the food unfit for consumption, "par-
ticularly if it is of such a nature as in common knowledge could be
reasonably anticipated and guarded against by the consumer. '"'7 This
language suggests that liability may be found when the natural defect
is one not reasonably anticipated by the consumer. Another part of
the opinion, however, implies that liability should be denied in all
cases involving natural defects, 8 perhaps on the dubious assumption
that all natural defects are in fact anticipated by consumers. Thus the
court appears to have based its decision upon both the element of
naturalness and the expectations of the consumer: "Bones which are
natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately be called a
foreign substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to
anticipate and be on his guard against the presence of such bones."' 9
I6 d. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148.
" Id. at 681, 59 P.2d at 147-48 (emphasis added).
' Id. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148. This conclusion is supported by the court's decision in Goetten
v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 59 P.2d 142 (1936), in which the plaintiff, a patron of the
defendant restaurant, recovered damages for injuries sustained from consuming ground glass
in a chow mein dinner. The fact that Goetten was decided on the same day as Mix emphasi/es
the distinction drawn by the court between natural and foreign defects.
11 6 Cal. 2d at 682, 59 P.2d at 148.
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Despite its ambiguity on this point, the Mix decision has been
widely embraced as the leading case on the subject of natural defects
and as authority for the denial of liability where the injurious sub-
stance is natural to the product's ingredients. Following the Mix
doctrine, the Iowa Supreme Court in Brown v. Nebiker0 affirmed a
directed verdict for the defendant restaurant in a case in which death
had resulted from the ingestion of a bone sliver in a pork chop.
Similarly, an Illinois appellate court denied recovery in Goodwin v.
Country Club,2' in which the plaintiff's deceased had swallowed a
bone contained in creamed chicken served by the defendant country
club. Other courts also adopted the Mix foreign-natural test.22
Mix and its progeny did not escape the criticism of commenta-
tors. 23 Professor Reed Dickerson remarked that "[i]nsofar as these
cases rest on the notion of 'naturalness' in the sense that nothing that
is an inherent part of the raw product itself can be a legal defect, they
do not hold water. 21 4 Dickerson and others believed that the foreign-
natural distinction provided a confusing and often misleading basis
for decision. Because of this confusion, the Mix rationale was taken
to its logical extreme by a California court in Silva v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co. 25 The plaintiff in Silva was denied recovery as a matter of
law for an injury received from swallowing a turkey bone. The bone
had been hidden in the dressing served with the defendant restaurant's
roast turkey dinner. Because it decided to "look upon the service as
one dish as delivered, in which there was no substance not 'natural
to the type of meat served, ' 26 the court adopted a standard which
apparently would give judgment for a defendant whenever an inju-
rious object is natural to any food item served on a plate.
One case in which the plaintiff did recover under the Mix doc-
trine was Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc. v. Cotter.2 7 He had sustained
injury from eating a piece of crab shell in a seafood dish in which crab
meat was not an ingredient. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the defendant restaurant's liability on an implied warranty
20 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941).
21 323 III. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944).
21 E.g., Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718
(1949) (bone in barbecue pork sandwich). Cf Courter v. Dilbert Bros., Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 935,
186 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (prune pit in jar of prune butter) (possibly dictum).
23 R. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 183-90 (1951) Ezer,
The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281 (1961); Schag, Consumer Expectation-The Test ofaSubstance Natural
to a Food as a Legal Defect, 15 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 311 (1960).
24 R. DICKERSON, supra note 23, at 185.
z' 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1938).
26 Id. at 651, 83 P.2d at 77.
212 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954).
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theory, arguing that the crab shell was "foreign" to the seafood meal
because it contained no crab meat. But under the same rationale, it
appears that if the meal had contained crab meat, or if the injurious
shell had been of the variety "natural" to the seafood used in the dish,
a recovery would have been denied.
B. Efforts to Circumvent the Mix Doctrine-Emergence of the
Expectation Test
Under the Mix formulation of the foreign-natural test, a food
processor or seller could not be held liable for injuries caused by a
substance indigenous to any ingredient in a product. A few courts, in
attempting to avoid the arbitrariness of such a rule, went beyond the
common meaning of the Mix foreign-natural distinction. These
courts reasoned that, even though a deleterious substance is natural
to an ingredient in a product, the substance may still be considered
foreign to the product in the form sold to the consumer. For example,
in Bryer v. Rath Packing Co. 2 1 the plaintiff sued for the defendant's
negligence in packing cans of "Ready to Serve Boned Chicken" used
by a school cafeteria in preparing chicken chow mein. A small
chicken bone concealed in the chow mein had lodged in the esophagus
of a young student. The appellate court in Bryer considered the issue
in the case to be "whether bones which are natural to the type of food
eaten but which generally are not found in the style of the food as
prepared are to be deemed the equivalent of a foreign substance in
determining whether the food in which they are is reasonably fit and
safe for human consumption."29 The court answered in the affirma-
tive, reversing the trial court's judgment for the defendant, and held
that the issue was properly one for the jury to decide. A similar
approach was employed by a New York trial court in Lore v. DeSi-
mone Brothers.3 0 The plaintiff in that case sued a retailer and a
manufacturer for personal injuries sustained from eating a piece of
sausage containing a sharp bone fragment. Although the plaintiff
failed to prove the defendants' negligence, the trial court held the
retailer liable for a breach of implied warranty, finding that the bone
fragment was not natural to the meat product in its processed state,
and that a consumer would not anticipate the presence of such a
defect. In Wood v. Waldorf System, Inc.,31 a chicken bone in a
chicken soup product had lodged in the plaintiffs throat, resulting in
- 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959).
" Id. at 108, 156 A.2d at 444 (emphasis added).
n 12 Misc. 2d 174, 172 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
31 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951).
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an award of damages for the manufacturer's negligence. In response
to the defendant's arguments that liability could not be imposed
when the injury was caused by such natural objects as bones, the court
said:
Assuming that chicken bones are natural to and are used in the
preparation of such soup, we do not think that it is necessary,
natural or customary that harmful bones be allowed to remain con-
cealed in this type of soup as finally dispensed to a customer so as
to relieve the purveyor of such food of all responsibility. In our
judgment, the question is not whether the substance may have been
natural or proper at some time in the early stages of preparation of
this kind of soup, but whether the presence of such substance, if it
is harmful and makes the food unfit for human consumption, is
natural and ordinarily expected to be in the final product which is
impliedly represented as fit for human consumption.32
Thus the court in Wood also viewed the defect as one essentially
foreign to the food product in the style or condition in which it was
sold to the plaintiff.
The Bryer, Lore, and Wood decisions demonstrate the propen-
sity of a few courts in the 1950's to focus upon the state of the food
product as sold or served, rather than merely upon the ingredients of
the product, to determine whether the defect was natural or foreign
to the food. In doing so, these courts were in effect distinguishing
between raw or unprocessed foods, in which bones and seeds might
still properly be considered natural flaws, and processed foods in
which bones and seeds would ordinarily be considered foreign to the
finished product. Such a distinction must be one of degree, and inevit-
ably must take into consideration the ordinary expectations of the
consumer. Professor Dickerson recognized this in 1951, and advo-
cated the abandonment altogether of the foreign-natural terminology
in favor of a reasonable expectation rationale:
The better test of what is legally defective appears to be what
consumers customarily expect and guard against. Canned foods are
expected to be found already washed, cleaned, and trimmed, while
the same foods in fresh form normally call for work of that sort by
the consumer.33
Another writer, commenting upon the reasonable expectation ap-
proach, predicted:
While different jurisdictions may vary as to what the expectation
32 Id. at 6, 83 A.2d at 93.
13 R. DICKERSON, supra note 23, at 185.
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may be in a particular situation, the increased utilization of this
approach will, by eliminating preoccupation with "natural" [sic] as
a test in itself, help formulate a more rational and consistent basis
for judicial decision. 34
It was an accurate prediction because, following the appearance of
this alternative rationale in the Dickerson treatise and elsewhere, the
Mix approach was eventually abandoned by several courts in favor
of the more flexible expectation test.35
II. THE CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST IN OHIO
A. Allen v. Grafton
It was in the context of this debate about the foreign-natural and
reasonable expectation tests that the Supreme Court of Ohio first
examined the question in 1960. The supreme court had previously
sanctioned recovery for an injury caused by a foreign substance in
food, " but before its decision in Allen v. Grafton3 7 the court had
never expressly considered the appropriateness of relief for injuries
caused by natural defects. The plaintiff in Allen alleged that he had
swallowed a three-by-two centimeter piece of oyster shell embedded
in fried oysters served by the defendant restaurant. Damages were
sought for abdominal injuries on theories of negligence and breach
of implied warranty of fitness. The trial court's decision to sustain
the defendant's demurrer was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
Hamilton County. The Supreme Court of Ohio then reversed the
appellate court and affirmed the trial court's judgment for the defen-
dant.
The supreme court acknowledged in Allen that a restaurant im-
pliedly warrants its food to be reasonably fit for consumption, and
that violation of the Ohio Pure Food and Drug Act prohibiting the
sale of "adulterated" food38 constitutes negligence per se.'9 -How-
ever, in a four-to-three decision the court held as a matter of law that
the presence of a single piece of oyster shell in a serving of six fried
oysters did not justify a legal conclusion that the food was rendered
31 Schag, supra note 23, at 319. See also Rheingold, What Are the Consumner's "Reason-
able Expectations"?, 22 Bus. LAw. 589, 592 (1967).
1 E.g., Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1967): Stark v. Chock
Full O'Nuts, 77 Misc. 2d 553, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp..
10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
2 E.g., Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
2' 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960).
= Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 3715.52 (Page 1971) prohibits the manufacture, sale, delivery,
holding or offering for sale of any food that is "adulterated."
1, 170 Ohio St. at 251, 164 N.E.2d at 170.
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either "adulterated" 40 or "unfit for consumption."
The majority opinion is puzzling because the grounds for deci-
sion are only vaguely explained. Attesting to its ambiguity is the
absence of any articulated underlying legal basis in the court's sylla-
bus." The opinion begins with an exhaustive survey of food products
liability cases from other jurisdictions, noting especially the Mix line
of cases wherein liability had been summarily denied. But, as if it
preferred to eschew the cases in which naturalness of the defect was
determinative of liability, the court remarked that it was inclined to
agree with Professor Dickerson's criticism of the naturalness test and
his suggestion that the better test was one of consumer expectation.4 2
Thus the "foreign-natural" distinction was seemingly rejected as the
controlling test:
In the instant case, it is not necessary to hold, as some of the
...cases do, that, because an oyster shell is natural to an oyster
and thus not a substance "foreign" to an oyster, no liability can be
predicated upon the sale of a fried oyster containing a piece of
oyster shell.43
' Food is "adulterated" under OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3715.59(A) (Page 1971) if:
It bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render
it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added substance, such food
shall not be considered adulterated if the quantity of such substance in such food does
not ordinarily render it injurious to health [emphasis added].
As to the last clause of the statute, the court in Allen concluded that a single piece of shell
in a serving of fried oysters "does not ordinarily render it injurious to health," despite the fact
that the plaintiff in the case before the court had alleged an actual injury. However, the court
said:
A different problem would be presented if the shell had been shattered into smaller
pieces which could not be readily removed from the oyster so as to leave any substan-
tial edible portion that was free from such pieces. In the latter instance, a contention.
that the oyster would constitute "adulterated" food or food not reasonably fit for
eating, might be more persuasive.
170 Ohio St. at 252, 164 N.E.2d at 170.
Cf Fouke & Reynolds v. Great Lakes Co., 33 Ohio App. 2d 273, 294 N.E.2d 245 (1972),
in which an Ohio appellate court concluded that mercury consumed by fish in their natural
habitat is not an "added substance" within the meaning of§ 3715.59(A), and that evidence in
the case was insufficient to prove that the quantity of mercury in the fish ordinarily rendered
the fish injurious to health. The fish therefore were held not to be adulterated. Cf also United
States v. 1232 Cases American Beauty Brand Oysters, 43 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Mo. 1942). In
interpreting a clause in the definition of adulterated food in 21 U.S.C.A. § 342(a)(1) (1972) that
was identical to the Ohio definition, the district court held that the government could not
condemn certain cases of oysters containing shell fragments because the quantity of fragments
did not render the oysters injurious to health.
11 As to decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, only the pronouncements of law set out
in the syllabus (or in per curiam opinions) are given precedential effect. State ex rel. Canada
v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
12 170 Ohio St. at 258, 164 N.E.2d at 174.
13 Id.
NOTE
Instead the court in Allen appeared to be basing its decision for the
defendant upon a "reasonable expectation" test:
In our opinion, the possible presence of a piece of oyster shell
in or attached to an oyster is so well known to anyone that we can
say as a matter of law that one who eats oysters can reasonably
anticipate and guard against eating such a piece of shell, especially
where it is as big as the one described in plaintiff's petition."
While the naturalness of the defect was not the only determin-
ing factor in Allen, it was nevertheless a crucial consideration in the
application of the expectation test:
[T]he fact, that something that is served with food and that will
cause harm if eaten is natural to that food and so not a "foreign
substance," will usually be an important factor in determining
whether a consumer can reasonably anticipate and guard against
it. 45
Predictably, the Allen decision has received different interpreta-
tions. It has been cited by a few courts as authority for the foreign-
natural test,4" and by others for the reasonable expectation test.47
Commentators also disagree." In Ohio, there has yet to be any subse-
quent clarification of the decision by the supreme court, and few Ohio
lower courts have treated the subject in the sixteen years since Allen.
The first relevant case in Ohio citing the Allen decision, Hecht v.
Giunta's Stop & Shop Market,49 involved a consumer who had
sustained dental injuries by biting down upon a peppercorn in the
defendant's salami. In granting judgment for the plaintiff, the trial
court held that if a food processor includes within a product a hazard
known or constructively known to the processor, but unanticipated
by the consumer, and if the hazard is not brought to the attention of
the consumer, the processor and the seller are liable for resulting
injuries. 0 The court rested its decision upon its view that the con-
" Id. at 259, 164 N.E.2d at 174-75 (emphasis added).
Id. at 258-59, 164 N.E.2d at 174.
' Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Musso v. Picad-
illy Cafeterias, Inc., 178 So. 2d 421, writ denied, 248 La. 468, 179 So. 2d 641 (1965).
11 Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). Cf. Webster v. Blue
Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964).
" Allen is interpreted as a "foreign-natural" case in King, Commercial Law, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 261, 265 (1961), but interpreted as a "reasonable expectation" case in Freedman, Allergy
and Products Liability Today, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 492 (1963); Schag, supra note 23, at 316.
' 40 Ohio Misc. 6, 317 N.E.2d 269 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1974).
The typical "foreign-natural" problem is turned on its head in a case like Hecht. In the
cases previously discussed, the deleterious objects were often natural to an ingredient of the
product, but foreign to the product itself as sold to consumers. In Hecht, the reverse was
true-peppercorns are not natural to meat, but arguably are natural to a finished salami
product.
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sumer expectation approach was adopted by the supreme court in
Allen.
B. Consumer Expectation: A Question of Law or Fact?
To some extent, the uncertainty associated with the Allen deci-
sion may be attributed to the fact that the court held as a matter of
law that a plaintiff-consumer could reasonably anticipate finding an
oyster shell in a serving of fried oysters. In most cases it would seem
that the reasonable expectations of consumers would be factual mat-
ters reserved for the jury. In other words, a consumer's expectation
as to the likelihood of encountering a particular type of deleterious
object or substance in a food product would seldom be so obvious to
the court that it could decide the question as a matter of law. As the
dissenting opinion argued in Allen, "reasonable minds could find that
a shell fragment of the size alleged in the petition was not a reason-
ably expected defect, and that therefore the food served was not
reasonably fit for human consumption." 5' The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reached the same conclusion in Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co.,;2 which involved an oyster shell in a can of oysters.
The plaintiff in Bonenberger sued the retail seller of the oysters on
an implied warranty theory, and the trial judge directed a verdict for
the defendant. The supreme court reversed, holding that the issue of
whether the oysters were "reasonably fit" was one for the jury.
By upholding the trial court's determination of the consumer
expectation issue as a matter of law without saying much more, the
supreme court in Allen left uncertain the circumstances in which the
issue should go to the jury, or whether it should ever go to the jury.
One Ohio appellate court recently ordered the trial court to submit
the issue to the jury in Thompson v. Lawson Milk Co.5" The plain-
tiff had allegedly broken a tooth on small, hard objects, apparently
bone or cartilage, contained in the defendant's chopped ham. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on
the basis of Allen, holding as a matter of law that a consumer
should reasonably expect such natural defects in meat products.
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed, stating that
the Allen test of consumer expectation was an issue for the jury to
consider, not strictly a matter of law.
The appellate court in Thompson wisely chose to construe the
Allen decision narrowly, limiting the latter case's determination that
11 170 Ohio St. at 260, 164 N.E.2d at 175 (Matthias, J., dissenting).
12 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942).
-1 48 Ohio App. 2d 143, 356 N.E.2d 309 (1976).
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the trial judge may decide the issue of consumer expectation to the
particular facts and circumstances of that case. It may sometimes be
proper for a trial judge to judicially notice that a specific natural
defect may be found on occasion in a specific food product, and that
the occurrence of such a defect is a matter of common knowledge in
the community. 4 When it is indisputable that reasonable persons
customarily expect to find such specific imperfections in their food,
a court may decide the issue as a matter of law. In most instances,
however, when reasonable minds could disagree about the reasonable
expectations of consumers, a factual question is presented for the
deliberation of the jury.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The recent trend among several states has been toward accep-
tance of the reasonable expectation test. Where the test is applied,
the issue of consumer expectation is typically reserved for the jury.
For example, four months after Allen v. Grafton55 was decided in
Ohio, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Betehia v. Cape Cod
Corp.5 that an action for negligence and breach of implied warranty
could be maintained against a restaurant by a patron who swallowed
a chicken bone contained in a chicken sandwich. Criticizing the strict
foreign-natural distinction applied in the California decision of Mix
v. Ingersoll Candy Co.,57 the Betehia court said:
This reasoning is fallacious because it assumes that all sub-
stances which are natural to the food in one stage or another of
preparation are, in fact, anticipated by the average consumer in the
final product served. . . . Naturalness of the substance to any in-
gredients in the food served is important only in determining
whether the consumer may reasonably expect to find such substance
in the particular type of dish or style of food served.58
The proper test, the court held,
should be what is reasonably expected by the consumer in the food
as served. . . . What is to be reasonably expected by the consumer
is a jury question in most cases; at least, we cannot say as a matter
of law that a patron of a restaurant must expect a bone in a chicken
sandwich either because chicken bones are occasionally found there
or are natural to chicken.59
See, e.g., Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 59 P.2d 144, 148 (1936).
170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960).
10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
10 Wis. 2d at 328, 103 N.W.2d at 67.
Id. at 332, 103 N.W.2d at 69 (emphasis added).
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In Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc.,6" the plaintiff sued on both
negligence and implied warranty theories for an injury to her teeth
and gums caused by biting down on a walnut shell in the defendant's
maple walnut ice cream. Applying a strict application of the natural-
ness test, the trial court granted a summary judgment for the defen-
dant. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that the proper
standard in that state was the reasonable expectation test. Consumer
expectation, said the court, should be a jury question in most cases.
A similar result was reached in Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Restaurant,
Inc.,6" in which the plaintiff brought suit for negligence and breach
of implied warranty after biting into the pit of an olive served in a
cocktail by the defendant restaurant. The trial court directed a verdict
for the defendant on the implied warranty theory because the olive
pit was a natural part of the food in which it was found. The appellate
court reversed, stating:
In our view it is unrealistic to deny recovery as a matter of law
if, for example, a person is injured from a chicken bone while eating
a sliced chicken sandwich in a restaurant, simply because the bone
is natural to chicken. The exposure to injury is not much different
than if a sliver of glass were there. . . . It is a different matter if
one is injured by a bone while eating a chicken leg or a steak or a
whole baked fish. There, it may well be held as a matter of law that
the consumer should reasonably expect to find a bone.
We think the question of what appellant was reasonably justi-
fied in expecting was properly a jury question here."2
Of course, some of the states that previously had applied the
foreign-natural test still adhere to it. California, for example, the
state generally credited with originating this test in the Mix decision,
apparently still follows its own precedent, summarily denying liability
in cases involving deleterious defects natural to the food product's
ingredients. 3
Other courts have often had great difficulty in formulating a
sensible rationale for denying a food processor's liability. One inter-
esting Massachusetts case, Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc.,"
held that the presence of fish bones in fish chowder did not constitute
a breach of implied warranty. After framing the issue in the case as
201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1967).
61 272 A.2d 846 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1971).
Id. at 849 (emphasis in original).
Maiss v. Hatch, 8 Cal. Rptr. 351 (Super. Ct. 1960) (bone in hamburger).
347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964). The court's opinion is entertaining in its zealous
digression into the history of chowder, complete with recitation of several New England recipes.
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whether a fish bone was a foreign substance making the chowder
unwholesome or unfit to eat, the court finally relieved the defendant
restaurant of any liability on what appeared to be a reasonable expec-
tation rationale, concluding: "We should be prepared to cope with the
hazards of fish bones, the occasional presence of which in chowders
is, it seems to us, to be anticipated, and which, in the light of a
hallowed tradition, do not impair their fitness or merchantability."65
Consider also the 1966 Oregon case of Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus
Enterprises,6 in which the plaintiff sought damages for dental injuries
sustained from a cherry pit hidden in the defendant's cherry pie. The
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the defendant vend-
ing machine owner. After discussing both the foreign-natural and
reasonable expectation tests, the court declined to decide which stan-
dard should apply in that state. Unable even to ascertain what test
had been applied by the trial court, the supreme court resigned itself
to the conclusion of the trial judge that the matter was a "mixed
question of law and fact. 617
In New York, the courts have been at variance in determining
liability for natural defects in foods. An appellate court in Woods v.
Cabash Restaurant, Inc.6" held as a matter of law that the presence
of a turkey bone in an open turkey sandwich did not constitute either
negligence or breach of implied warranty by the defendant restaurant.
The dissenting judge argued that the question of consumer expecta-
tion should have gone to the jury. The dissent correctly criticized the
court's reliance upon Courter v. Dilbert Brothers, Inc.,9 pointing out
that the plaintiff in Courter, injured by a piece of a prune pit from a
jar of prune butter, did in fact recover damages from the retailer for
breach of implied warranty. Another New York appellate court re-
cently decided to ignore the Woods decision, and adopted the expec-
tation test instead, in Stark v. Chock Full O'Nuts70 In Stark, the
plaintiff established a prima facie case that injury had resulted from
a walnut shell in the defendant's "nutted cheese" sandwich. Because
the defendant chose not to contradict the plaintiff's testimony, the
trial court entered a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The appellate
court affirmed, declaring that
this tribunal now adopts the "reasonable expectation" doctrine.
Under this doctrine, a plaintiff can recover for breach of implied
Id. at 426, 198 N.E.2d at 312.
" 243 Ore. 546, 415 P.2d 13 (1966).
" Id. at 551, 415 P.2d at 15.
8 UCC REP. SERV. 192 (N.Y. App. Div., Oct. 15, 1970).
" 19 Misc. 2d 935, 186 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
o 77 Misc. 2d 553, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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warranty of fitness (UCC § 2-315) if it is found that the natural
substance was not to be reasonably anticipated to be in the food,
as served.7
Oklahoma only recently joined the ranks of those states adopt-
ing the "reasonable expectation" test in a 1974 decision, Williams v.
Braum Ice Cream Stores, Inc. ,72 which held that whether the plaintiff
could have reasonably expected to find a cherry seed or pit in cherry-
pecan ice cream presented a jury question. The federal district court
in Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co.,73 applying Texas law in a diver-
sity suit, determined that the reasonable expectation test would be the
applicable standard in Texas as well, 74 and reserved the issue of con-
sumer expectation for the jury.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
All courts recognize that food processors owe a general duty to
the consuming public to exercise due care in the preparation and
output of their products. 75 Few courts today could justify a rule
shielding a food processor from liability for a breach of that duty
when the product involved contains a sharp piece of wire, glass, or
other foreign object causing serious injury to a consumer. Yet the
case law embodying the foreign-natural test categorically immunizes
the same processor from liability when the injury is caused by a
sharp bone fragment, a hard fruit pit, or a piece of nut shell, simply
because the defect is a natural element of an ingredient in the product.
Certainly teeth can be broken and internal tissues lacerated as easily
by bone fragments and nut shells as they can be by ground glass and
stones.
Why, then, if injurious natural objects are no less a health hazard
than injurious foreign objects, have some courts fashioned a rule
insulating food processors and sellers from liability for the inclusion
of the former in their products? The answer often given is that the
processor cannot practicably remove all bones, seeds, and other natu-
11 Id. at 554, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (emphasis added). The dissenting judge agreed that the
expectation test was the applicable test in New York, but maintained that the court, in its
"[zleal to more firmly establish, in this jurisdiction, the correct rule of the so-called 'reasonable
expectation test,'" had improperly affirmed the directed verdict for the plaintiff instead of
requiring the trial court to submit the case to the jury. Id. at 556, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
72 534 P.2d 700 (Okla. App. 1974), writ denied, 46 OKLA. BAR ASSN. J. 557, 16 UCC REP.
SERV. 627 (1975).
13 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (oyster pearl in can of oyster soup).
71 The court remarked that "the 'reasonable expectation' approach is considerably more
compatible and consistent with Section 402A [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS] which has
been adopted as the law of Texas in product liability cases." Id. at 1065.
Is See, e.g., cases cited note 7 supra.
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ral defects from its products, and that for this reason it is unfair to
expect a "perfect" product. 6 But a manufacturer is in fact expected
to produce a "perfect" product to the extent that the product must
be free of any injurious foreign objects. It seems illogical to say that
a processor should take precautions to protect the public from dele-
terious foreign objects in its products, but that it need not be as
concerned about removing bone or shell fragments even when it is
practicable to do so. To apply a strict foreign-natural test of liability
has precisely that effect, significantly lowering the standard of ordi-
nary care owed to the consumer.
As we have seen, some states have occasionally attempted to
avoid the unfairness of the naturalness doctrine without forsaking it
entirely by focusing the inquiry upon the style of the food product as
sold or served. In other words, liability has been imposed when the
injurious substance was "foreign" to the food as sold in its processed
state, even though the substance was not "foreign" to all of the
ingredients of the product.7 These cases have tended only to obfus-
cate the problem. Recall, for example, Zabner v. Howard Johnson's,
Inc.,71 the Florida case discussed earlier in which the plaintiff re-
covered damages after biting into a walnut shell in the defendant's
maple walnut ice cream. There the court explicitly adopted the rea-
sonable expectation test. One concurring judge who did not disagree
with the majority's rejection of the foreign-natural test nevertheless
implied that the court could have reached the same result by a differ-
ent interpretation of the test:
The difficulty with the foreign-natural test lies not in its theory
but in its artificial application. It seems to me that what is natural
to a substance is what is reasonably expected to be found therein.
Only by a strained construction of the term can a shell be considered
natural to ice cream. The foreign-natural test is too often applied
at a preliminary stage of production and with reference to a single
ingredient rather than to the final consumer product. By moving the
focus of the test to the consumable item the foreign-natural distinc-
tion as measured by the consumer's reasonable expectations be-
comes a valid and relevant standard.79
But at what stage of production, as the concurring judge in Zabner
"' See Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718
(1949); Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 178 So. 2d 421, writ denied, 248 La. 468, 179 So.
2d 641 (1965).
" E.g., Lore v. DeSimone Bros., 12 Misc. 2d 174, 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (bone
in processed sausage).
" 201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1967). See text accompanying note 60 supra.
" Id. at 828 (Andrews, J., concurring).
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phrases it, does a walnut shell cease to be a natural defect and begin
to acquire the characteristics of a foreign defect? Although it is pre-
ferable to a strict application of the foreign-natural test because it
employs an element of expectation, the above view diverts the analy-
sis from the true determinative factor to be ascertained in each
case-the customary expectations of consumers.
It is not surprising therefore that several courts recently have
abandoned the foreign-natural terminology altogether in favor of the
reasonable expectation rationale." These courts have recognized that
not all natural defects are reasonably anticipated, and that the condi-
tion or form in which the product is sold may be more important in
determining consumer expectations than the mere naturalness of the
defect. A consumer might reasonably expect to find T-bones in T-
bone steaks, fish bones in whole baked trout, chicken bones in fried
chicken, and pits or seeds in fresh fruit. For these ordinarily expected
defects, of course, a food processor should not be subject to civil
liability. A court might even find that the question of consumer ex-
pectation with regard to such defects is so indisputable that a directed
verdict for the defendant processor or seller would be justified. How-
ever, a consumer ordinarily might not expect to find bones in canned
ravioli, bones in canned chicken chow mein, walnut shells in walnut
ice cream, or pits in cherry preserves. For a plaintiff to be denied
compensatory damages for injuries received from these natural but
unanticipated defects, simply because of an arbitrary foreign-natural
distinction, is now being recognized by several courts as a harsh and
unjust result.
Perhaps an explanation for the courts' recent abandonment of
the foreign-natural test can be found in a growing sentiment of con-
sumerism, or at least in an awareness that "the seller, by marketing
his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a
special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it."'" That attitude has also led to a greater
interest in the imposition of liability without regard to fault, espe-
cially in the area of food products liability. Under the strict liability
doctrine as formulated in the Second Restatement of Torts,8 2 the
0 E.g., cases cited note 35 supra.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if(a) the seller
is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold.
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seller of an injurious product may be held strictly liable in tort if the
product is both defective and "unreasonably dangerous."" It is not
surprising, therefore, that the reasonable expectation test in food
liability cases has become popular only since the emergence of the
strict liability concept in the early 1960's, for the reasonable expecta-
tion test is clearly compatible with the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement. 4 The Restatement itself maintains that the defective
product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it.",- On
that basis, if courts continue to move in the direction of strict liability
as they have in the past two decades,86 it is probable that the reason-
able expectation test will become firmly established as the general
rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past fifteen years, courts in several jurisdictions have
rejected the foreign-natural test in food products liability cases in
favor of a consumer expectation test.87 No longer is a plaintiff in these
jurisdictions categorically denied a civil remedy for injuries resulting
from the consumption of unanticipated natural defects in foods. No
longer is a food processor or seller in these jurisdictions arbitrarily
shielded from liability for the inclusion of deleterious natural sub-
stances in its products.
The principal objection to the reasonable expectation test is that
it imposes too heavy a burden upon processors and sellers, requiring
them to become virtual insurers of their products. 8 A food processor,
although not an insurer, does have a "duty of ordinary care to elimi-
nate or remove in the preparation of the food he serves [or sells] such
harmful substances as the consumer of the food, as served, would not
ordinarily anticipate and guard against." 9 With the prevalence of
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although (a) the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
Rheingold, supra note 34, at 589-90.
" See Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
'z RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
See 63 Am. JUR. 2d Products Liability §§ 123-50 (1972).
E.g., cases cited note 35 supra.
Some writers have expressed the view that manufacturers and sellers should be consid-
ered insurers of their products, an idea often advanced in support of the strict liability concept.
"Such a liability provides a kind of consumer insurance whereby the aggregate of people
consuming the particular product, by paying slightly higher prices, share the financial burdens
caused by defective food products." R. DICKERSON, supra note 23, at 135 (footnote omitted).
In effect, strict liability provides a means for spreading the cost of risk or loss among consumers
as a class.
" Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1967).
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processed foods on the market today and the development of technol-
ogy in the food industry, consumers increasingly rely upon food pro-
cessors to inspect and purify the foods they consume. Many products
today are even packaged in such a manner that inspection by the
consumer is difficult if not impossible. One might imagine a con-
sumer in a jurisdiction that applies the foreign-natural test tearing
away the crust from a beef pot pie to search for tiny bones, or picking
apart a cherry-nut ice cream cone to remove stray shells or pits.
In an era of consumerism, the foreign-natural standard is an
anachronism. It flatly and unjustifiably protects food processors and
sellers from liability even when the technology may be readily avail-
able to remove injurious natural objects from foods. The consumer
expectation test, on the other hand, imposes no greater burden upon
processors or sellers than to guarantee that their food products meet
the standards of safety that consumers customarily and reasonably
have come to expect from the food industry.
As indicated previously, the test of liability in Ohio remains
unclear.9" The sole pronouncement on the subject by the Supreme
Court of Ohio raised as many questions as it answered, but it is
evident that the court did not perceive much value in the foreign-
natural test alone. Whether the court intended to adopt wholeheart-
edly the consumer expectation approach, and whether the expectation
question will ordinarily be submitted to the jury in Ohio remains to
be determined.
Charles Robert Janes
See text accompanying notes 38-54 supra.
